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I.

INTRODUCTION

The publication of a proposed Criminal Code for Tennessee was
the most noteworthy event in substantive criminal law in 1972,1 and
a proposed Code of Criminal Procedure appeared at the first of the
I. The present survey encompasses cases published in the National Reporter System
during the calendar year 1972. It therefore includes some cases decided in 1971 and does not
include other cases decided during the year but not yet reported. Some of the latter cases had
appeared in abbreviated form in the CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER, and reference to some of these
reports will be made in the footnotes,
Frequent references will be found to previous surveys in this series. The complete citations
are as follows: 1968 Survey, 36 TENN. L. REV. 221 (1969); 1969 Survey, 37 TENN. L. REV.
433 (1970); 1970 Survey, 38 TENN. L. REV. 182 (1971); 1971 Survey, 39 TENN. L. REV. 247
(1972).
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new year.' Of special local interest was the determination by the
United States Supreme Court that the Tennessee statute requiring a
defendant to testify first for the defense or not at all was unconstitutional.' Other significant decisions elaborated upon the right of an
officer to frisk a suspect,4 amplified the constitutional right to a
speedy trial,5 further restricted the right to counsel at identifications'
and permitted the use of non-unanimous jury verdicts.7
II.

OFFENSES

Against Person

A.

I.

Homicide

Since all homicides in Tennessee are presumed to be malicious,
they are therefore presumed to be second-degree murder. The burden
of proof falls upon the state to raise the offense to first-degree murder
and upon the defense to reduce it to manslaughter, or justifiable or
excusable homicideY A further presumption frequently appearing in
homicide cases is the presumption of malice when death results from
the use of a deadly weapon.' 0 This latter presumption would appear
superfluous in light of the former that would subsume all such instances, but it is not unusual for both statements to appear in the same
case." Apparently, the presumption arising from the use of a deadly
weapon is a stronger presumption, since it is explicitly indicative of
a malicious state of mind. 2 The presumption is probably of greatest
2. Selective references will be made herein to the proposed codes in situations where the
proposals bear directly on a matter otherwise the subject of discussion.
3. See pp. 610, 611 infra.
4. See pp. 586-88 infra.
5. See pp. 593-95 infra.
6. See pp. 604-05 infra.
7. See pp. 608-10 infra.
8. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2401, 2403 (1955).
9. Hornsby v. State, 479 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Bailey v. State, 479
S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
10. Pernell v. State, 475 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971): Hornsby v. State, 479
S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971): Bailey v. State, 479 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1970).
I1. See, e.g., cases cited in both notes 9 and 10, supra.
12. "Malice is not necessarily confined to an intention to take the life of the deceased,
but includes an intention to do any unlawful act which may probably result in depriving the
party of life. It is not so much spite or malevolence to the individual in particular as an evil
design in general, the dictates of a wicked and depraved and malignant heart." Bailey v. State,
479 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). See 1969 Survey at 436-40.
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significance in cases in which a substantial argument may be made
to reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter. For example, in
Hornsby v. State, 3 the defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder in the death of her husband. The record indicated an extended
period of marital discord, largely engendered by the alcoholism of the
victim. The court affirmed a conviction of second-degree murder,
relying upon the presumption arising from the use of a deadly
weapon, and thereby rejecting the theory, persuasive to the dissent,
that the death resulted in the heat of passion. 4 The outcome of the
case would likely be different if the defendant had caused death, for
example, by hurling an ashtray at her husband rather than shooting
him. 5
The proposed Criminal Code eliminates the concept of malice
from the definition of murder'" because, according to the drafters, it
"has become virtually meaningless."' 7 Rather, the Code focuses on
the terms "intentional"'" and "knowing"' 9 in describing the mental
condition required for murder.2 0 The practical effect of this modification is to remove from the classification of murder death resulting
from "drunken driving and other grossly reckless conduct."'"
13. 479 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
14. Judge Galbreath, dissenting, concluded that "the deceased and the defendant were
engaged in that form of mutual, albeit domestic, combat that resulted in a killing, upon sudden
heat and adequate provocation that our law has always deemed manslaughter." Id. at 656. Cf.
Mosley v. State, 477 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971), where a conviction of second-degree
murder was reduced to voluntary manslaughter in a death resulting from mutual combat.
15. Of course, an ashtray of impressive proportions could easily be designated a deadly
weapon by the court. See 1968 Survey at 223-25.
16. CRIMINAL CODE § 1102 (Tent. Draft, Oct. 1972).
17. Id., comment at 167.
18. "A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct
or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result." Id. § 405(a).
19. "A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that
the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to cause the result." Id. § 405(b).
20. "(a) [Aln individual or corporation commits murder if: (1)he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another .. " Id. § 1102.
21. Id., comment at 167. The drafters observe that "in all probability" this would be the
result. In discussing the distinction between intent and knowledge, the following example is
suggested: "[T]he owner who burns down his apartment building to collect the insurance doesn't
desire the death of his tenants, but he is practically certain it will occur." If it may be assumed
that "practical certainty" requires such an approximation to the inevitable, numerous circumstances heretofore treated as murder would no longer be so defined. For example, the driver
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The proposed Code also eliminates the distinction between first
and second-degree murder, accomplishing this amalgamation by deleting the element of premeditation. 2 In McGill v. State,23 the court
explained "deliberation and premeditation" as follows:
It is not necessary that this fixed design and intention to kill
should have been conceived or have pre-existed in the mind of the
killer for any definite period of time prior to its execution. It is
sufficient if it preceded the assault, however short the interval, for
the length of time it was entertained is not the essence of this constitutent of the offense. The design may be conceived and deliberately
formed only an instant before its execution."
In that case, in sustaining a finding of premeditation in a death
arising out of mutual combat, the court observed:
Such matters as the atrocity, cruelty, and malignity appearing in the
circumstances under which the killing took place have been passed
on frequently by the courts in considering the sufficiency
of the
5
evidence to sustain a conviction for first degree murder.1
Premeditation is most prominent in those cases when there is evidence of a carefully planned criminal endeavor." In Pernell v. State,"
who speeds excessively through a school zone or an area congested with pedestrians. See Lee
v. State, 41 Tenn. 2 (1860). The construction worker who recklessly throws building materials
from the top of a building. Id. (dictum). The drunken driver who becomes intoxicated, knowing
that he will have to drive himself home. See Edwards v. State, 202 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500
(1957). The drag racers who drive two-abreast on a two lane winding road. See Stallard v. State,
209 Tenn. 13, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961).
22. "Attempts to distinguish between the two types of murder solely on the basis of the
nebulous term 'premeditation' . . . have proven meaningless . . . . The Commission is of the
opinion that such a determination of culpability should be made in the sentencing portion of
the trial and not confined by prior determination that the murder is of a designated degree."
CRIMINAL CODE,

comment at 167 (Tent. Draft, Oct. 1972).

23. 475 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
24. Id. at 227. See also 1970 Survey at 185-87.
25. 475 S.W.2d at 228. Even with such inference, the evidence of premeditation in this
case is weak. See also Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
26. Ervin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 211,212-13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) ("Defendant further
contends there is an insufficiency of evidence in that there is no premeditation to be found in
this record. With this we disagree. There is evidence in this record that Ervin: (1) learned of
his ex-wife's boyfriend a week before the encounter; (2) got his rifle out of pawn; (3) left the
car and went on to his ex-wife's premises with the rifle loaded; (4) gave his friend instructions
to park defendant's car some blocks away from the house; (5) waited in the back yard until
deceased drove up and then went to the front and shot deceased when he started out the door.
We are disposed to state that these factual events connote defendant was lying in wait, which
would be of a sufficiency in itself to support a first-degree murder conviction.").
27. 475 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
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the court found premeditation manifested by prior threats directed at
the victim.
B.

Against Property

1. Larceny
For a charge of larceny to be cognizable, it is necessary that the
property taken by the defendant be of value,28 a question that split
the Court of Criminal Appeals in Tillery v. State.29 The defendant, a
used car dealer, bought an automobile from another dealer, delivering a check for $350 and taking the car away. Defendant did not
receive title to the car at this time. 0 Payment was refused on the
check, but the defendant returned (or was brought) to the office of
the seller some two months later, for the ostensible purpose of paying
the face amount. Instead, he grabbed the check3 and left hurriedly
with the parting comment that the seller would have to prove possession of it.2 The defendant testified that he bought the car with the

understanding that he could receive title the following day. When he
was told three days later that the title was not ready, he declined to
put adequate funds in the bank to cover the check. He had ultimately
junked the car.
The defendant was convicted of larceny, not of the automobile,
but of a $350 check. There is no indication in the appellate report
whether the charge was grand or petit larceny; 3 the sentence of
three years 4 and attachment of infamy 5 could apply to either. The
dissent argued that the check was utterly worthless, and therefore
larceny had not been shown. Certainly it must be conceded that the
check was not worth $350; its value would appear to be no greater
28. See generally 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 488 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as WHARTON].
In Norris v. State, 475 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971), the court held that the
marked retail price of an item was, when uncontradicted, sufficient evidence of its value for
purposes of the shoplifting statute. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4235 (Supp. 1972).
29. 474 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
30. Thus, a charge of obtaining property by false pretenses would not lie. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-1901 (1955). See Canter v. State, 75 Tenn. 349 (1881). See also 2 WHARTON § 601.
31. According to the defendant, it was given to him.
32. The check was presented at trial by means of a microfilm copy made by the bank.
33. For grand larceny, the value of the goods must be over $100. TENN. CODE ANN. § 394302 (Supp. 1972).
34. Id. § 39-4204.
35. Id. § 40-2712 (Supp. 1972).
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than its intrinsic value as scrap paper. Thus, a charge of grand larceny
was untenable. As scrap paper, the check does have value, albeit
infinitesimally small." It is not necessary that the property, by itself,
have a current market value. 7 The single Tennessee precedent for
this principle is Osborne v. State'3 holding that a pistol could be the
subject of larceny, notwithstanding the fact that it had no market
value because its sale would be illegal. Nevertheless, there is precedent favoring the conclusion of the dissent to the effect that a counterfeit bill is utterly worthless and therefore not the subject of larceny. 9
Support may also be found in the Tennessee case of Busier v. State,40
where the defendant was charged with stealing flowers from a grave,
and the court, in dictum, noted: "[w]here floral offerings have withered and died and hence no longer serve the purpose of the donors,
they are not the subject of larceny.""
The confusion engendered in the present case is largely the result
of charging the defendant with the wrong offense. Obviously, the
primary conduct of the defendant subject to criminal sanction is the
wrongful conversion of the automobile. Larceny may be unprovable,
since the prosecution would have to show an intent to steal at the time
of the taking, that is, when the automobile was delivered." But there
would seem no barrier to charging the defendant with fraudulent
breach of trust,43 for which no intent to steal need be proven.44 Alternatively, the defendant could be charged with drawing a check with
insufficient funds,4 5 but again the burden would fall on the prosecution to prove "fraudulent intent" at the time of the taking.
The proposed Criminal Code contains a section on determination of value,46 including the following clause:
36. It would appear that the defendant was charged with "larceny of a $350.00 check."
Granted this is not the same as "larceny of a check valued at $350." But if indeed the crime
were properly described as the theft of a piece of scrap paper, would a three year sentence be
the likely outcome? Cf.Boyle v. State, 37 Tex. 359 (1872).
37. See WHARTON § 488.
38. 115 Tenn. 717, 92 S.W. 853 (1903).
39. State v. Allen, R.M. Charlt. 518 (Ga. 1837); State v. Swart, 4 Rich. 356 (S.C. 1851).
40. 181 Tenn. 675, 184 S.W.2d 24 (1944).
41. Id. at 683, 184 S.W.2d at 27.
42. See Hillv. State, 159 Tenn. 297, 17 S.W.2d 913 (1929). See also 2 WHARTON § 453.
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4226 (1955).
44. See, e.g., Norton v. State, 217 Tenn. 265, 397 S.W.2d 183 (1965).
45. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1959-60 (Supp. 1972). The statute does create a presumption of intent. The defendant testified that he had been indicted for this offense but that the
charges had been nolle prossed.
46. CRIMINAL CODE § 1907 (Tent. Draft, Oct. 1972).
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The value of documents, other than those having a readily

ascertainable market value, is:

(1) the amount due and collectible at maturity less any part
that has been satisfied if the document constitutes evidence of a
debt; ....

While probably not intended to cover cases such as the present, the
language employed could be so construed. The proposed Code abolishes distinctions in the present Code between various theft offenses,47
and creates a single offense denominated "theft," 4 but an intent to
deprive the owner of his property must be present at the time of the
taking. The present case might also be affected by a separate section
concerning the presumption of intent to deprive the owner of property
by issuance of a check. 9
The crime of larceny from the person"0 was clarified by the 1972
session of the General Assembly. Larceny from the person is a hybrid
offense, more serious than larceny, 5 ' but less serious than robbery. 2
The amended statute delineates three elements of the offense in Tennessee: (1) The taking must be from the person, not merely his presence; (2) "The theft must be committed without the knowledge of the
person from whom the property is taken, or so suddenly as not to53
allow time to make resistance before the property is carried away;''
and (3) The property must go into the possession of the thief but need
not be carried away.5 4 The amendment to the statute also creates the
offense of attempted larceny from the person, carrying a punishment
of one to three years. Larceny from the person would appear to have
been eliminated from the proposed Criminal Code.
47. Id. § 1902.
48. id. § 1903.
49. Id. § 1905.
50. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4206 (Supp. 1972).
51. The potential punishment for larceny from the person, however, is identical to that
for grand larceny. It would thus appear that only in the case of stealing property of value not
in excess of $100 would there be any advantage to the prosecutor in charging larceny from the
person.
52. See 2 WHARTON § 502.
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4206(2)(b) (Supp. 1972). This language appears to be lifted
from 2 WHARTON § 176.
54. This element would appear superfluous, since common law larceny does not require
a carrying away to satisfy the element of asportation. 2 WHARTON §§ 133-34.
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2.

Fraudulent Breach of Trust

In Stewart v. State,55 the defendant was convicted of fraudulent
breach of trust" based upon the conversion of a tape recorder. The
prosecution showed that the tape recorder had been delivered to the
defendant for repair and that he had never returned it, despite repeated demands. The defendant relied upon the testimony of his wife
that she had deliberately thrown the tape recorder away. The court
held that the jury was justified in rejecting the testimony of the wife
and finding the defendant guilty. The dissenting opinion submitted
that "[m]ere failure to return bailed property left with the bailee for
repair does not constitute breach of trust.""7 Nevertheless, in overruling a petition to rehear, the court reaffirmed its conclusion, holding
that "[c]ircumstantially, a purposeful fraudulent breach of trust has
58 s
been committed.
The conclusion of the majority is bolstered by the decisions interpreting the statute as not requiring an intent to steal. For example,
in Switzer v. State, 9 the defendant, president of a retail outlet for air
conditioners, assigned several installation contracts to a finance company in order to obtain working capital. Customer payments were to
be made directly to the finance company, but should any be received
by the defendant, they were to be promptly forwarded. The prosecution resulted from the action of the defendant in depositing customer
payments in the account of his company. The defendant contended
that there was no evidence that the money was appropriated to his
personal use and that there was evidence that he fully intended to pay
the money owed. The court held that neither of these facts constituted
a defense to fraudulent breach of trust.60
484 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4226 (1955).
57. 484 S.W.2d at 79.
58. Id. at 80.
59. 213 Tenn. 671, 378 S.W.2d 760 (1964).
60. See also Norton v. State, 217 Tenn. 265, 397 S.W.2d 183 (1965); McCommon v.
State, 185 Tenn. 613, 207 S.W.2d 333 (1948); Burke v. State, 157 Tenn. 105, 6 S.W.2d 556
(1928). Fraudulent breach of trust is merged into the general theft offense in the proposed
Criminal Code. CRIMINAL CODE §§ 1902-03 (Tent. Draft, Oct. 1972).
55.

56.
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Against Person and Property
1. Robbery

In Snowball v. State," the defendant was convicted of robbery"
arising out of the following circumstances: The victim was approached by J at a stockyard with an offer to sell him a truck load
of cattle. Defendant told J not to bother dealing with the victim,
because he did not have any money. J then removed the victim's bank
book from his shirt pocket, examined it, and told defendant he was
wrong. The victim indicated he was interested in purchasing the cattle, and left to obtain some money at a bank, accompanied by J.
Upon returning to the stockyard with $5,000, defendant and two other
men approached the automobile, which frightened the victim, but J
assured him they would do no harm. What then ensued was an unadulterated employment of the shell game. 3 J urged the victim to put
down $500, but he refused. At this point, one of the accomplices
outside the car punched the victim, the latter being unable to tell
whether it was his finger or a gun barrel. J continued to insist that
the victim put down the money, and finally he did because, "I was
afraid not to." When J lost, he then demanded that the victim put
down a thousand dollars, and with more prodding, the victim complied. Eventually, the defendant and his cohorts relieved the victim
of his entire $5,000.
Since robbery is an aggravated larceny, initially it must be determined if larceny64 occurred. In Defrese v. State,65 the two conspirators
separately asked the victim for a ride on his wagon. Later, while the
wagon was stopped and one of the conspirators had left, the other
observed that he had dropped something. In the presence of the victim, he picked up the item, a folded up piece of paper, removed a
nickel from it, and refolded it. The other conspirator returned, was
advised that he had dropped something, and was given the folded
paper. He accepted it and immediately offered to bet the victim ten
61.

477 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (1955).
63. -[T]he defendant produced three plastic bottle caps and a foam rubber ball, small
enough to be completely covered and hidden under one of the caps, and ostensibly started a
gambling game with Jacques. In this confidence game the small ball is placed under one of the
caps and, after their positions are completely shuffled and altered several times, the participants
bet as to which of the caps conceals the ball." 477 S.W.2d at 242.
62.

64.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4202 (1955).

65.

50 Tenn. 53 (1870).
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dollars that there was a five-cent piece in the paper. The victim first
refused, but ultimately was inveigled, much in the fashion of the
present case,6" to bet his watch against forty dollars. The paper then
was torn open and a nickel found. 7 The court sustained a conviction
of larceny. 8
Defrese was distinguished, however, in Metcalf v. State, 9 where
the victim at least had a chance to win. Indeed the Metcalf decision
would appear apposite the present problem. There the conspirators
were convicted of larceny, purportedly resulting from a game of
three-card monte. The victims were soldiers at a military base, who
were lured into the arrangement in a fashion similar to the cases
above. The court described the routine as follows:
In the case at bar three Aces were used. Two of them were
black. The other was red. The game consisted of a placing of these
cards face downward on some substance, here a pillow, after a bet
by the dealer (gambler) that the soldier would not pick up the red
card. The trick by which it was intended to defraud the soldier was
in the skillful manner in which the dealer placed the cards on the
pillow in the presence of the victim, who, because of the very deceiving manner in which the cards were handled, was falsely lead to
believe that he saw where the red card was placed on the pillow.
Naturally he picked up that card. But in every instance, as to each
of the three soldiers, it turned out to be one7 of the two black cards.
The red card was, however, on the pillow.

The court pointedly observed: "It is to be noted in the Defrese
case that the victim had no chance to win since there was a nickel in
the paper and the defendant Defrese . . .knew that. ' 71 In reversing
the conviction of larceny, the court said:
66. Coincidentally, in both cases there was evidence that the same swindle had previously
been attempted by the same defendant.
67. "According to the witness, the process is simple. A card is split open to the center
on one side, and a five cent coin inserted; the card is then folded up with another coin enclosed.
The office of one of the confederates is to drop the card, as if casually, in the presence of the
victim, and then to turn away, while the other picks it up, opens it, and takes out one of the
coins, and then refolds it, all in full view of the victim. On the approach of the other, he claims
the package, and at once offers to bet that there is a five cent coin in it. The victim, having
seen the coin taken out, is easily entrapped." 50 Tenn. at 58.
68. See also Hall v. State, 65 Tenn. 522 (1873).
69. 205 Tenn. 598, 329 S.W.2d 824 (1959).
70. Id. at 600-01, 329 S.W.2d at 825.
71 Id. at 602, 329 S.W.2d at 825.
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The conduct of the swindler in the case at bar with reference
to where he seemed to have placed the red card, as distinguished
from where he actually put it, may very well be regarded as a false
pretense. Yet, it seems far fetched to hold that either soldier picked
the one of the three cards which he did pick because of confidence
in the dealer. To the contrary, he picked the card which he did pick
because, as he watched the cards as they were dealt, he thought he
saw where the red card was placed on the board.
In the absence of statute, the fact situation in this case is inconsistent with the generally accepted definition of larceny. These soldiers necessarily knew that the manner in which the dealer was
dealing these cards was for the purpose of confusing them as to
where on the board he was putting the red card. But they thought
they saw where it was put, and based on that thought selected that
the money placed on the bet if their
card, voluntarily surrendering
72
selection proved erroneous.
The holding of the Metcalf case would presumably be dispositive
in the present case if: (1) the ball was under one of the caps, and (2)
the victim voluntarily participated in the game. Presumably, (1) is
true, absent any indication to the contrary. Therefore, Metcalf should
control unless it may be concluded that the victim was not a willing
participant in the game. Such a conclusion is supported by his testimony. According to the testimony of the defendant, however, the
victim at all times voluntarily participated in the game. The court
concluded that the jury could reasonably reject the defendant's evidence and accept the state's theory.
There remains, however, the question of aggravating the offense
to robbery. Apparently, the only evidence of the employment of force
in Snowball was contained in the testimony of the victim that one of
the accomplices began "punching me while he was trying to get me
to put my money down. I don't know whether he was punching me
with his finger or a gun barrel. ' 73 The defendant, on the other hand,
denied that any force or threat was involved.74 It is true that Tennessee precedent sustains the notion that robbery can be accomplished
by "the pointing by the robber in his coat pocket of his finger or hand
so as to make the victim believe the bulge to be a pistol." 75 Yet surely
72. Id. at 603, 329 S.W.2d at 826.
73. 477 S.W.2d at 242.
74. "They jump in then and lose their money, and then they will holler robbery, he'll
holler most anything to try to get his money back." Id. at 243.
75. Cooper v. State, 201 Tenn. 149, 152, 297 S.W.2d 75, 77 (1956).
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there must be an objective reasonableness in the apprehensions of the
victim. It is quite a leap to go from a potential penalty of three to
ten years for grand larceny," to five to fifteen years for robbery,77 on
the testimony of the victim that someone other than the defendant
himself punched him with a gun or maybe a finger."
D.

Public Offenses
1. Obscenity

In Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad,7" a federal court
sustained the action of city officials of Chattanooga in refusing to
lease the municipal auditorium for a production of the rock musical
"Hair" because the production was obscene under the Roth standard. 0 Nor was it of any significance that the performance would
only be viewed by a consenting audience."'
Among the more intriguing enactments of the 1972 session of the
legislature was a statute making it a misdemeanor to display for sale
any publication containing material of a predominantly sexual nature
at a height less than five and one-half feet above the floor. 2 A violation of the statute carries a fine of fifty dollars, and each magazine,
book or newspaper so displayed constitutes a separate offense.
III.
A.

DEFENSES

Insufficient Evidence

At common law, no corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice is required to support a conviction." In a number of states,
however, including Tennessee, some corroboration is required. 4 Ten76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4204 (1955).
77. Id. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1972).
78. The defendant received a sentence of five to twelve years.
79. 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). But see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City
of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971), reaching the opposite result.
80. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
81. "If audience consent were the test of First Amendment protection, then cock fights,
bull fights, and Roman gladiatorial contests could no longer be regulated or forbidden by law."
341 F. Supp. at 477.
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1018 (Supp. 1972). Excepted are adult bookstores to which
persons under the age of eighteen are not admitted.
83. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 3447 (12th ed. 1955).
84. Clapp v. State, 94 Tenn. 186, 30 S.W. 214 (1895) (murder); Robison v. State, 84
Tenn. 146 (1885) (housebreaking and larceny); Hall v. State, 71 Tenn. 552 (1879) (arson).
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nessee courts have been particularly stringent in this regard, requiring corroboration in sodomy cases even where the accomplice is a
minor, 5 unless the prosecution can show evidence of non-consent, in
which instance the witness will be treated as a victim rather than an
accomplice." Most courts treat a minor as a victim in virtually all
sodomy cases. 7 In Scola v. State,"8 a conviction of attempted sodomy
was reversed where the only evidence presented by the prosecution
was the testimony of the fifteen-year-old accomplice who was "an
admitted liar and apparently a juvenile delinquent." 9
B.

Insanity

Proof of the defense of insanity is always problematical, because, while the sole issue is the mental state of the accused at the
time of the offense charged, there is normally no direct evidence of
sanity at that moment. Rather, evaluations of the mental competence
of the accused are made after the fact, and an assumption is entertained that the same condition existed at the time of the offense. On
one hand, the fact that the accused is presently insane does not mean
he was insane at the critical moment, and, conversely, present sanity
does not preciude insanity at the time of the offense."
The latter possibility was raised in Meade v. State,9" where the
defendant, convicted of third-degree burglary, contended that he was
temporarily insane at the time the offense occurred, while conceding
that he returned to his senses when he was caught in the criminal
endeavor.92 At trial, the defense presented the testimony of a clinical
psychologist who concluded that the defendant probably was temporarily insane. The response of the prosecution was to attempt to
discredit the expert testimony and to present testimony of four lay
witnesses-two arresting officers, the bondsman and the jailer-all of
whom stated that they observed no signs of mental illness. The de85. Sherrill v.State, 204 Tenn. 427, 321 S.W.2d 811 (1959).
86. Davis v. State, 442 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
87. See 1969 Survey at 457 n.141.
88. 474 S.W.2d 144 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
89. Id.at 145.
90. In one sense, the defendant is always sane when the issue is raised, otherwise he could
not stand trial.
91. 484 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
92. "When caught he was rational and reasonable, declined to make a statement, and
asked for a lawyer." Id. at 367.
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fense also introduced evidence that the defendant had an I.Q. of 84
and when fifteen years of age had been institutionalized in a hospital
for the mentally retarded. In affirming the conviction, the court
found the jury justified in rejecting the testimony of the psychologist,
implying that he "showed himself an advocate rather than a dispassionate expert." 93 The court concluded that this view was "the only
evidence" of insanity at the time of the act. Yet, it may be observed
that there was no evidence of sanity at the time of the act, and, as
the dissent observed:
While the State is not bound to establish the defendant's sanity
in the first instance, if the defendant's or the State's evidence raises
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity, such evidence relieves the defendant of further9 4 proof upon that issue and shifts the
burden of proof to the State.
The dissent concluded that the non-expert testimony was wholly insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof to establish sanity, and therefore the defense was good.
The proposed Criminal Code abolishes the M'Naghten test9"
traditionally used in Tennessee" and replaces it with a variation of
the Model Penal Code test.97
IV.

A.
i.

PROCEDURE

Equal Protection
Working Off Fines

Two United States Supreme Court decisions have virtually eliminated the practice of converting a penal fine into a period of incarceration when the convicted party is unable to pay. In Williams v.
Illinois,9" the Court held that such a procedure was a denial of equal
93. Id. The passage is part of an extended quotation from Mullendore v. State, 183 Tenn.
53, 191 S.W.2d 149 (1945).
94. 484 S.W.2d at 370. See Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1911); King v.
State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169 (1892).
95. 8 Eng. Rep. 200 (1843).
96. See. e.g., Spurlock v. State, 212 Tenn. 132, 368 S.W.2d 299 (1963).
97. "A person is not criminally responsible for what otherwise would be an offense if at
the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense, as a result of a mental disease or
defect, he lacked capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated." CRIMINAL CODE § 601 (Tent.
Draft, Oct. 1972).
98. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). See 1970 Survey at 202-03.
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protection when the resulting sentence was greater than that permitted by the statute for the offense. In Tate v. Short,99 the Court held
that the conversion formula was always unconstitutional when applied to an offense for which the only penalty provided was a fine.
The recent Tennessee case, State v. Walding, 00 presented a situation
not covered by either decision. The defendant was convicted on two
worthless check charges and was sentenced to sixty days in jail and a
fine of $150. When he had completed the jail sentence, he sought his
release without payment of the fine because of his indigency. Were
the fine converted to a jail term at the statutory rate of five dollars a
day,' 0' the total sentence would not exceed the maximum prescribed
by law, but the trial judge instead allowed the defendant to pay the
fine in weekly installments of twenty dollars. The appellate court
affirmed the action of the trial judge. While neither Williams nor
Tate involved such a situation, the Tate Court had adopted the view
of four justices in Morris v. Schoonfield I that the conversion of a
fine to a jail term in the case of an indigent was per se impermissible.'" 3 Installment payment of fines are now authorized by statute." 4
2.

Right to Transcript

Chicago,1°5 the

In Mayer v.
Supreme Court held that an indigent
defendant had the right to a transcript without cost, to the extent such
was necessary for an effective appeal.' The Court observed that an
entire transcript would not be needed in every case,'"7 and in the
08 the Court found alternacompanion case, Britt v. North Carolina,'
99. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). See 1971 Survey at 258-59.
100. 477 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
101. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1223 (Supp. 1972).
102. 399 U.S, 508 (1970).
103. "[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an
indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum
term that may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine. In each case, the
Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically
converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay
the fine in full." Id. at 509.
104. TENN. CODE ANN. §§40-3207-09 (Supp. 1972). These provisions are incorporated
in the proposed Code. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§2603-04 (Tent. Draft, Jan. 1973).
105. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
106. See 1971 Survey at 259-61.
107. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (quoted in Mayer).
108. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
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tive means could adequately fulfill the function of a transcript. 9 In
Dotson v. State," the court held it unnecessary to supply at state
expense "a complete record for the potential petitioner to pore over
in hopeful efforts to find some constitutonal defect of which he has
not enough inkling to allege in a petition.""' The need for transcripts
has been partially alleviated by a statute making it "lawful for attorney representing parties in proceedings in any of the courts of this
state to use tape recorders as an aid in making notes on the proceedings."1

2

B.

Arrest, Search and Seizure
1. Temporary Detention

Every confrontation between an officer and a suspect is not an
arrest," 3 and every search does not require probable cause in the
traditional sense." '4 Recent acts of terrorism and sabotage have resulted in an increasing judicial tolerance of relatively minor intrusions
on individual liberty that in another era might not survive fourth
amendment scrutiny. The most prominent example has been the surveillance and searching of airline passengers in an effort to thwart
hijacking, but other areas are similarly affected." 5 In Downing v.
Kunzig,"5 plaintiff-attorney was stopped by a guard upon entering
the Federal Building in Detroit on his way to court and asked by a
guard io submit his briefcase for inspection."' When he refused to do
109. The availability of the court reporter to read back portions of the trial transcript
was held sufficient. Cf. United States v. Young, 12 CRIM. L. REP. 2317 (6th Cir., Nov. 29,
1972).
110. 477 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
Ill. Id. at 764.
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1331 (Supp. 1972).
113. United States v. Jones, 336 F. Supp. 41 (E.D, Tenn. 1972).
114.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

115. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
116. 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
117. The circumstances that led to the systematic searches were described by the court
as follows:
The General Services Administration . . . is vested with the power to promulgate
all needful rules and regulations for the government of federal property under its
charge and control. One such rule provides that 'no person while on property shall
carry firearms, or other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly
or concealed, except for official purposes.' . . . Because of an outburst of acts of
violence, bombings of federal buildings and hundreds of bomb threats, resulting in
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so, and refused to leave his briefcase behind, he was declined admittance and left. Thereafter, he brought the present action for a declaratory judgment that the compulsory inspections were violative of the
fourth amendment. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
case by the trial court, holding that "the regulations and acts . . . in
light of the factual background and the dangers confronting the Gov' I8
ernment, were both reasonable and fair." "
The power of officers to frisk suspects under circumstances falling short of probable cause to arrest" 9 received constitutional legitimation in Terry v. Ohio.20 The parameters of the Terry authorization
would appear to have been expanded by the holding of the Court in
Adams v. Williams. 2' Early in the morning, an officer on car patrol
was approached by a person known to him and advised that an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was in possession of narcotics and
had a gun at his waist. The officer proceeded to the vehicle, tapped
on the window and requested the occupant to open the door. Instead,
the latter rolled down the window, and the officer immediately
reached into the car and removed a revolver from his waistband, for
the illegal possession of which he was convicted. The weapon had not
been visible from outside the vehicle. The accused attempted to distinguish Terry on the ground that the frisk here was not based on the
officer's own observations, but the Court concluded such a distinction
was immaterial. The officer was properly investigating a tip given
massive evacuations of federal property, and direct financial loss to the Government,
G.S.A. in the fall of 1970 issued to all its Regional Administrators across the country
supplementary instructions directing that immediate measures be adopted at federal
facilities within their areas for the protection of federal property and personnel.
Specific steps included the use of additional guards and patrols, the identification of
persons entering federal buildings, and the denial of entrance to persons carrying
suspicious packages unless they should voluntarily submit such packages for examination.
Id. at 1231.
118. Id. at 1233. "As clearly demonstrated by the facts of this case, the threat to federal
property as well as to the safety of federal personnel performing essential functions of Government was direct and immediate and likely to materialize into acts of violence and destruction
in any part of the nation. For the responsible governmental agency to have failed to act when
confronted with such a situation could have resulted in a widespread disruption of the processes
of government." Id. at 1232.
119. See J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 43
(1972) [hereinafter cited as PRETRIAL RIGHTS]; Cook, The Art of Frisking, 40 FORDHAM L.
REV. 789 (1972).
120. 392 U.S. 1 (1961).
121. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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him by an individual who had provided him information in the past,
and, because of the substance of the tip, he had "ample reason to fear
for his safety."'2
It may be conceded that the officer did have reason to be concerned for his own safety, but only because he chose to cause the
confrontation that created those conditions. As the suspect's being
seated in a vehicle is wholly unindicative of criminal behavior, unlike
the conduct in the Terry case, the justification for the intrusion must
rest upon the tip from the informant. It is true, as the majority
indicates, that the officer had received information from the informant in the past, but it is also true, as only the dissent points out, that
that information had been inaccurate, or at best unconfirmed.' 23 The
dissent concluded that "[i]f the Court does not ignore the care with
which we examined the knowledge possessed by the officer in Terry
when he acted, then I cannot see how the actions of the officer in this
case can be upheld."'2 4
The proposed Code of Criminal Procedure codifies the authority
to make a Terry-type investigative detention." 5 The officer may de122. Id. at 148. "When Williams rolled down his window, rather than complying with
the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his movements could more easily be seen,
the revolver allegedly at William's waist became an even greater threat. Under these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden
constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was
reasonable." Id.
123. Id. at 156-57.
124. Id. at 158.
125. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 602 (Tent. Draft, Jan. 1973) provides in full:
Cases in Which Stop Authorized
(a) A peace officer may stop any person he observes in circumstances that give the
peace officer reasonable cause to suspect that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense involving the use or attempted use of force
against the person or the theft, damage, or destruction of property if the stop is
reasonably necessary to obtain or verify an account of the person's presence or
conduct, or to determine whether to arrest the person.
(b) A peace officer may stop any person he finds near the scene of an offense that
the peace officer has reasonable cause to suspect has just been committed if:
(I) the peace officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the person has knowledge of material aid to the investigation of the offense; and
(2) the stop is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the person's identity
or an account of the offense.
(c) A peace officer may stop any person in connection with an offense that the
peace officer has probable cause to believe has been committed if:
(I) The offense is a felony involving the use or attempted use of force against
the person or the theft, damage, or destruction of property; and:
(A) the peace officer has reasonable cause to suspect the person committed the felony; and
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mand of the person detained his name and address and, when appropriate, subject him to viewing by others near the scene of the stop for
identification.' Under the proposed Code, the officer is: (1) required
to identify himself; (2) to inform the suspect that he is not under
arrest and that he will be released in no more than twenty minutes,
barring a subsequent arrest; (3) to advise the person that he is only
being detained as a witness, if this is the case; and (4) to inform him
of his right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used
against him, and that he has the right to terminate the questioning
at any time.2 7 "After the authorized purposes of the stop have been
accomplished or 20 minutes have elapsed, whichever occurs first, the
peace officer shall allow the person to go unless he has arrested the
person."'
Frisking is specifically authorized by the proposed Code of
Criminal Procedure' although it would not appear that the section
would have authorized the frisk that occurred in the Adams case.
2.

Authority to Issue Warrant

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is a question of law and therefore traditionally has been the
prerogative of a judicial officer. 3 ° A significant departure, in sub(B) the stop is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the person's identity to determine whether to arrest the person for the felony; or
(2) the peace officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the person was
present at the scene of the offense, and the stop is reasonably necessary to obtain or
verify the person's identity.
126. Id. § 604.
127. Id. § 605. The advisement of constitutional rights prescribed here has not been
viewed as compulsory in Terry-stop situations.
128. Id. § 606.
129. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 603 (Tent. Draft, Jan. 1973) provides in full:
(a) A frisk is a search by an external patting of a person's clothing.
(b) A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person under Section 602 [see note
125 supra] may:
(I) frisk that person, and take other reasonably necessary steps for protection,
if the peace officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the person is armed and
presently dangerous to the peace officer or another persons [sic] present; and
(2) take possession of any object the peace officer feels during the course of
the frisk if the peace officer has probable cause to believe the object is a deadly
weapon.
(c) Nothing seized by a peace officer in a frisk conducted under this section is
admissible in any criminal action, civil suit, or administrative proceeding unless the
stop, frisk, and seizure were authorized under this chapter.
130. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 16.
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stance if not in form, from that tradition was taken by the Supreme
Court in Shadwick v. City of Tampa.13' There the Court held that a
municipal court clerk, without formal legal training, could properly
issue warrants for arrest. The essential requisite was that the officer
occupy a position of "neutrality and detachment."' 32 Because the
municipal ordinances being enforced involved relatively minor and
uncomplicated matters, the Court concluded such clerks were competent to render decisions on probable cause. 3
3. Abandoned Property
The seizure of abandoned property 34 does not require a warrant
where the particular evidence 3 ' or the premises searched 36 have
been abandoned by the accused. Abandonment of the premises may
be the result of eviction.' 3 7 But in Rambo v. State, 1 8 the court held
that the search of an automobile could not be justified on the theory
of abandonment where the vehicle had been taken into police custody
prior to the time the accused made his escape.
4.

Exigent Circumstances

A warrantless search is reasonable where the exigent circumstances are such as to render impractical any effort to obtain a war131. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
132. Id. at 350. "There has been no showing whatever here of partiality, or affiliation of
these clerks with prosecutors or police. The record shows no connection with any law enforcement activity or authority which would distort the independent judgment the Fourth Amendment requires." Id. at 350-51.
133. "Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that these clerks lack capacity to
determine probable cause. The clerk's authority extends only to the issuance of arrest warrants
for breach of municipal ordinances. We presume from the nature of the clerk's position that
he would be able to deduce from the facts on an affidavit before him whether there was probable
cause to believe a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace, drunkenness, trespass or
the multiple other common offenses covered by a municipal code. There has been no showing
that this is too difficult a task for a clerk to accomplish. Our legal system has long entrusted
nonlawyers to evaluate more complex and significant factual data than that in the case at hand.
Grand juries daily determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments, and trial juries
assess whether guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The significance and responsibility
of these law judgments betrays any belief that the Tampa clerks could not determine probable
cause for arrest." Id. at 351-52.
134. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 48.
135. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See also 1970 Survey at 210-12.
136. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1964). See also 1970 Survey at 210-12.
137. United States v. Roberts, 465 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1972).
138. 481 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn. 1972).
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rant.'39 In United States v. Langley, 40 at 3:30 a.m. the police received a call regarding a suspected burglary, a neighbor reporting the
presence of a rented truck in the driveway. Officers proceeded to the
address, observed the truck and found most of the windows of the
house taped with newspaper. There was no response to a knock at
the door. The vertically sliding door on the truck was slightly open,
and one of the officers observed what appeared to be large packing
crates within. Suspecting that someone might be hidden inside, he
pushed the door open and entered the vehicle. He found no one, but
took down identifying marks on five packing crates. After leaving the
vehicle, the officer went to a window where he could see through a
part in the drapes and observed the movement of a person. He also
observed a box similar to those found in the truck. The information
obtained by the officers in this fashion was later included in an affidavit for the search warrant, which the defendant contended was the
fruit of an illegal search. The court held that the circumstances justified the officers' looking into the house and into the truck, 4 ' but that
the entry of the truck by the officer and the copying of data from the
crates was improper. Since, however, the remaining information in
the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant
was properly issued.
5.

Consent

For a consent to constitute a waiver of fourth amendment rights,
it must appear that the accused was not merely acquiescing to a
display of authority by the officer.' 42 Thus in Vaughn v. State,'43 the
139. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 49.
140. 466 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1972).
141. The court analogized the action to a protective frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 293 U.S.
1 (1968).
142. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). But see Earles v. State, 12
CRIM. L. REP. 2217 (Tenn. Sup. Ct., Nov. 6, 1972):
We do not believe that the Bumper opinion is a blanket prohibition that no consent
can ever be given where an invalid warrant is involved. Such a holding ignores the
realities of life and denies the long standing principle that the existence and voluntariness of a consent to search and seizure is a questionof fact to be decided in the light
of attendant circumstances . . . . We believe that the Bumper case stands for the

proposition that it is possible to give valid consent to search even after the existence
of the warrant is made known, but the State must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the consent is not based upon the warrant and was not coerced by other
factors. It is conceivable that a person could give a voluntary and uncoerced consent
to search even though he had been informed that the officers had a search warrant,
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court found an absence of effective consent to the search of an automobile trunk where the accused manifested strong reluctance in permitting the officer to make the search.'44 The court also noted that
the accused knew that contraband would be found in the trunk, which
made it unlikely for him to voluntarily acquiesce to the search. It is
not, however, necessary that warnings comparable to the Miranda
warnings precede an effective consent. 4 '
6.

Prisons

Inmates of jails and prisons are subject to warrantless searches
of themselves and their belongings as a reasonable concomitant of
maintaining security. 4 ' In Hicks v. State,'47 the defendant while in jail
wrote a letter to his girlfriend, also in jail, that could easily be interpreted as an effort to fabricate an alibi. He entrusted the letter to a
trustee from whom it was recovered by a jail guard and ultimately
introduced as evidence. The court affirmed the conviction, holding:
Regardless of how the message got into the hands of the trustee
from whom the guard recovered it, there can be no doubt that jail
authorities have a legitimate interest in preventing messages being
surreptitiously sent from one part of the prison to another. 8
The court indicated that censorship of all prison mail was permissible, with the exception of communications with counsel, and possibly
communications with families and friends. Clearly, communications
between inmates were subject to surveillance, and the admissibility
of the document did not turn upon the manner in which it was obtained. 4 '
but the State would bear the burden of showing that the consent was sufficiently
independent of the warrant to remove the taint of its coercive nature.
143. 477 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
144. "The very fact that Vaughn refused the trooper's request to search in the first
instance is incongruous with validly consenting to the search. His hedging and delaying in
producing the key conveys to us acquiescing to authority rather than clear positive words and
actions denoting a valid consent." Id. at 263.
145. United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1972). See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 50;
1970 Survey at 213.
146. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 58.
147. 480 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
148. Id. at 360.
149. The self-incrimination dimension of this decision is discussed in the text accompanying note 242 infra.
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Governmental Action

The prohibitions of the fourth amendment are directed only to
action by governmental agents. Evidence seized by private parties, in
a manner that would be unconstitutional if done by a governmental
agent, will still be admissible. 50 Collusion, however, may effectively
turn the private party into a governmental agent,'' and, as Cash v.
Williams"2 illustrates, what begins as private action may eventuate
into a fourth amendment violation. There, an automobile was
stopped and the driver arrested for reckless driving and driving without a license. The officer directed a private garage owner to impound
the vehicle, intending to charge the owner with permitting an unlicensed driver to use the automobile. Later, the proprietor of the
garage searched the car for indicia of ownership for the purpose of
billing the towing charge. In the process, he found a bag of marijuana, although he was personally unable to identify it. He summoned a deputy sheriff who likewise could not make a positive identification. Finally, an agent of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
determined that the substance was marijuana, more of which was
discovered by a more extensive search. In granting a petition for
habeas corpus, the court held that the search by the garage man was
not violative of the fourth amendment, but that the participation of
governmental agents in the search was constitutionally impermissible. Ironically, if the garage man had simply seized the suspected
substance and delivered it to the official, the result would probably
have been different.
C.

GrandJury

Kiff,'5 3

In Peters v.
the Supreme Court for the first time held
that one indicted by a grand jury from which blacks had been systematically excluded could challenge the validity of the indictment, notwithstanding the fact that he was not himself black. The Court reasoned that "[i]llegal and unconstitutional jury selection procedures
cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process,"'5 4 and it
could not conclude that the exclusion was always harmless in the case
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1972). See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 81.
See 1971 Survey at 219-20.
455 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1972).
407 U.S. 493 (1972), noted in 40 TENN. L. REV. 275 (1973).
Id. at 502.
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of a white defendant.'5 5 A comparable argument was made in
Alexander v. Louisiana,' regarding the exclusion of women from the
deciding the issue, reversing the convicjury, but the Court avoided
57
tion on other grounds.1
D.

Speedy Trial

In Barker v. Wingo,5 8 the Supreme Court delivered the most
expansive opinion to date on the dimensions of the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial. Petitioner and another were indicted for murder on September 15, 1958, and petitioner's trial was set for October
21. The prosecution had a stronger case against the other defendant
and therefore sought a continuance in petitioner's case, in the hope
that after obtaining a conviction of the other defendant, he would
then testify against the petitioner. As it turned out, the prosecution
of the other defendant required six successive trials, the final one
coming in December 1962. A total of sixteen continuances of petitioner's trial was granted to the prosecution, no objection being made
to the first eleven. The twelfth continuance, in February 1962, was
countered by a motion to dismiss the indictment that was denied.
Two additional continuances were granted without objection, and in
February 1963, the prosecution moved to set trial for March 1963.
On the appointed day, however, it again moved for continuance because of the illness of the chief investigating officer. A continuance
for the same reason was granted in June, in both instances over the
petitioner's objection, although the court announced that the case
would be dismissed if not tried in the next term. Petitioner was finally
tried on October 9, 1963, after his motion to dismiss for violation of
the right to a speedy trial was denied, and he was convicted and given
155. "Moreover, we are unwilling to make the assumption that the exclusion of Negroes
has relevance only for issues involving race. When any large and identifiable segment of the
community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities
of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps
unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a
class in order to conclude, as we do, that their exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on
human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." Id.
at 503-04. See also 1970 Survey at 220-21, 239.
156. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
157. But see Justice Douglas, concurring: "The fact that Alexander is a male challenging
the exclusion of females from the jury rolls is not of significance, for his claim rests not on
equal protection principles, but on the right of any defendant to an impartial jury, no matter
what his sex or race." Id. at 635 n.2.
158. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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a life sentence. The conviction was affirmed,'59 and a petition for writ
of habeas corpus was denied, the court of appeals holding that objection to the delay was waived up to the point at which a motion to
dismiss was made,'"" and that there was no showing of prejudice
resulting from the remaining delay.' 6'
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but in doing so
afforded some guidelines for assessing speedy trial questions in the
future. Initially, the Court rejected the suggestion that it announced
a specific time period within which an accused must be scheduled for
trial, although it in no way discouraged lower courts and legislatures
from establishing such procedures. 62'
On the other hand, the Court was not satisfied with the "demand
rule," honored in the overwhelming majority of states, that generally
found a waiver of the right to speedy trial for the period prior to the
first demand for trial by the accused. Such a result was inconsistent
with the general principle that a waiver of a constitutional right could
not be presumed from silence.'63 It did not follow, however, that the
presence of a demand was irrelevant to the determination of the right:
We think the better rule is that the defendant's assertion of or
failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors
to be
6 4
considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right.
The "primary burden" remained with the courts and the prosecutors
to assure that cases are brought to trial."' Ultimately, the Court
resigned itself to an ad hoc evaluation of cases, with particular concern for four factors: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."' 6 6
"The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mecha159. Barker v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964).
160. The Court found that the court of appeals had erroneously concluded that the first
objection was made in February 1963, instead of February 1962. 407 U.S. at 518-19. The delay,
therefore, from the initial objection to trial was not eight, but twenty months.
161. Barker v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971).
162. 407 U.S. at 523. But see Jernigan v. State, 475 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tenn, Crim. App.
1971) ("We reject the proposal that we set an arbitrary time limit within which all cases must
be tried.").
163. The Court cited Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
164. 407 U.S. at 528.
165. Id. at 529.
166. Id. at 530.
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nism."' 67 Without some delay to raise a presumption of prejudice, it
would be unnecessary to pursue the matter further. The reasonableness of the length of the delay may take into account the nature of
the charge."6 8
If the reason for the delay is a deliberate effort to frustrate the
defense, it will probably not be tolerated. While the excuse of
crowded dockets is less condemnable, it remains a matter that the
government, not the defendant, controls. The most acceptable reason
would be that attributable to the preparation of the case for the
prosecution.
The presence or absence of a demand was viewed by the Court
to be evidential value in determining the seriousness of the prejudice
experienced by the defendant. "The more serious the deprivation, the
more likely a defendant is to complain."'6 9
The notion of prejudice encompassed three interests that had
been previously acknowledged by the Court: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired."' 170 While the Court acknowledged the last as the most
serious,' 7 ' it was not unmindful of the ancillary effects of pretrial
incarceration, as the loss of a job, the disruption of family life and
enforced idleness. Such effects, are especially unfortunate where the
individual is ultimately found not guilty.
In the present case, the Court found an insufficient showing of
a denial of the right to a speedy trial, relying principally upon the
paucity of evidence of prejudice and the indication that the petitioner
72
did not want a speedy trial.
E.

Guilty Pleas

The entering of a plea of guilty is generally held to be a waiver
167. Id.
168. "To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street
crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Id. at 531.
169. 407 U.S. at 531.
170. Id. at 532.
17 1. "[T]he inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There
is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past.
Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten
can rarely be shown." Id.
172. See also Pernell v. State, 475 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
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of all non-jurisdictional defects in prior stages of the proceedings.' 73
An unusual effort to evade this result arose in United States v. Cox.'74
There, the defendants entered pleas of guilty with the express reservation of the right to perfect an appeal on a search and seizure issue.
The present case was that appeal, and the court of appeals refused
to permit the defendants to compromise their guilty pleas in this
manner. The court found the only exception to the waiver rule to be
a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute under which the
defendant was convicted, 75 in reality a jurisdictional issue and, therefore, not even an exception to the rule. As to the present case, the
court concluded:
To the extent this procedure allows a defendant to plead guilty,
contingent on his right to appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds from
his own plea, it is not logically consistent and is against the trend
of recent case authority. There is a fundamental and basic inconsistency between knowingly and intelligently entering a voluntary plea
of guilty, and7 then appealing from the judgment entered on the basis
of that plea. 1
Furthermore, any substantive consideration of the contention of the
defendants would be in an artificial setting. Since there was no trial,
the challenged evidence was not introduced. Indeed, the prosecutor
might elect not to use the challenged evidence, notwithstanding the
ruling in its favor. Had it been introduced, there is no way of knowing
what other constitutionally unchallenged evidence might also be introduced. The result might then be an application of the harmless
error rule.' 77 In the face of innumerable variables, no legitimate purpose could be served by the court attempting to determine the merits
7
of the trial court ruling. 1

173. Allen v. Perini, 458 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972) (violation of Miranda rights): Taylor
v. State, 475 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) ("[T]he plea foreclosed the questions
of arrest, arraignment, interrogation, and pre-trial counsel."): Hill v. State, 478 S.W.2d 923
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
174. 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972).
175. See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
176. 464 F.2d at 942.
See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 80.
178. "Of course, it is conceivable that in some cases the only evidence available to the
prosecutor will be subject to a motion to suppress. Even in such asituation, we can see no reason
to allow the defendant to plead guilty following an unfavorable ruling on a motion to suppress
177.

and reserve his right to appeal. A trial of such limited evidence would be short and relatively
easy to try. We can think of no compelling policy ground for altering generally accepted notions
of the meaning and significance of guilty pleas for this rather limited category of cases." 464
F.2d at 945.

19731

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

The sticky problem remained for the court to determine what to
do with the case in light of its refusal to honor the agreement by the
parties below. Employing the contract law analogy to plea bargaining
suggested by the Supreme Court,'79 the court recognized that its refusal to honor the agreement "would constitute a failure of consideration within the plea bargaining process"' 0 and compel a vacation of
the pleas. To avoid this result, the court elected to fly in the face of
its own holding-evidently because it knew the result-and consider
the fourth amendment issue on its merits. It found the ruling of the
trial court correct and affirmed the conviction.
In other developments, in Recor v. State, 8 ' the court held proper
a stipulation made in the presence of the defendant that evidence
previously introduced against his wife could be considered by the jury
in determining his punishment. In Seaton v. State,'82 the court held
that an accused was not entitled to a severance for the express purpose of facilitating plea bargaining.
The proposed Code of Criminal Procedure openly recognizes
and seeks to regulate plea bargaining. Discussions between the district attorney and defense counsel "with a view toward reaching an
agreement" regarding charges and punishment in exchange for a plea
of guilty are authorized. 3 "The court shall not participate in any
such discussions."' 84 If an agreement is reached, its substance is to
be declared in open court prior to the taking of the plea. 85 "[T]he
court may accept or reject the agreement or may defer its decision
as to acceptance or rejection until receipt of a presentence report."' 86
If the agreement is accepted, it is incorporated into the judgment.,87
If rejected, the parties are so advised and opportunity is afforded for
further negotiations if desired.' According to the drafters' comment,
the judge "cannot accept the agreement and give a more favorable
disposition."' 189
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); 1971 Survey at 271.
464 F.2d at 946.
472 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
472 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1304 (Tent. Draft, Jan. 1973).
Id.
Id.§ 1305.

186. Id.
187.
188.
189.
a proposal

Id.§ 1306.
Id.
Id., comment at 142. It is not clear what would prevent the court from making such
directly to the accused in open court.
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Compulsory Process

A recurring problem in guaranteeing the right to compulsory
process'" concerns the failure of a defense witness to abide by a ruling
excluding all witnesses from the courtroom except when called to
testify.'"' Last year, a state and federal court faced with this issue
reached opposite results. In Johnson v. State,"2 the court sustained
the refusal of the trial court to permit the non-complying witness to
testify. The court distinguished Ezell v. State, 9 ' where the challenged witness had been a co-defendant at the outset of the trial. The
prosecution took a nolle prosequi against the witness, but the trial
judge failed to admonish him that he was then subject to the rule
excluding witnesses. The present case suggests that it is the responsibility of the defense to see that its witnesses do not violate the rule.
In Robinson v. Tennessee,9 ' however, the court reasoned that
the constitutional right of an accused could not be denied "where
neither he nor his counsel was at fault for the violation."'9 5 While a
violation of the rule should not go unnoticed, it is the witness to whom
sanctions should be applied rather than depriving the defendant of
material testimony. Concluded the court, so long as the defendant
and his counsel are not at fault, "[a] court . . . should have no

discretion to exclude the testimony of the witness violating an exclusion rule where the testimony of the witness was material to the
96
case."1
In Rucker v. Tollett,'9 7 it was the defendant who complained of
a violation of the rule. The official court reporter was permitted to
testify on the issue of voluntariness of the confession of the defendant,
notwithstanding the fact that he had been present during the testimony of the previous witnesses, and the rule had been invoked. The
court held that the exclusion of witnesses was discretionary with the
trial judge, and permitting this witness to testify was not an abuse of
discretion.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
191. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 16 (1967).
192. 477 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
193. 220 Tenn. 11,413 S.W.2d 678 (1967).
194. 340 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
195. Id. at 85.
196. Id. at 86. "[Tjhe credibility of the witness could be tested by reference to his
violation of the rule." Id. See also Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972).
197. 475 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
190.
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The proposed Code of Criminal Procedure codifies the discretionary power of the trial judge to exclude witnesses at the request
of the defendant or the prosecution. 9 ' The rule does not apply to the
defendant, the attorneys in the case, and the first witness for the
prosecution."'
G.

Right of Confrontation

1. Prosecution Witnesses
The right of confrontation does not require the prosecution to
call any particular witness to prove its case against the accused." °°
Occasionlly, however, the defense may seek the identity of an undisclosed governmental informant who has played a material part in the
development of the case for the prosecution. Where the issue is the
presence of probable cause for arrest or search, the government privilege of nondisclosure is universally recognized. 0' However, disclosure
may be required at trial where such is material to the preparation of
the defense. The landmark case is Roviaro v. United States,20° where
the Court held disclosure mandatory if it "is relevant and helpful to
the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of
the cause."2 3 In Phipps v. State, 04 a police chief testified over objection that he had received information from an informant that the
accused was in possession of stolen merchandise. The court concluded
that the testimony should not have been admitted, but the error was
harmless, because the witness had personally observed the delivery of
stolen property from the defendant to the informant.
2.

Confession of Co-Defendant

While in Bruton v. United States,25 the Supreme Court found a
denial of the right to confrontation in the introduction into evidence
at a joint trial of a confession of a co-defendant when the confession
implicated the defendant and the confessor did not take the stand,
§ 2103 (Tent. Draft, Jan. 1973).
See also Nicholas v. State, 478 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1972).
United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972).
See PRETRIAL RIGHTS §§ 21, 38.
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
Id. at 60-61.
474 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

205.

391 U.S. 123 (1968).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40

later in Harringtonv. California,"6 the Court held that a Bruton error
could be harmless. 0 1 A comparable result was reached in Schneble
20
where the confession of the co-defendant merely corrov. Florida,
borated the details of the defendant's own confession. The case was
complicated somewhat by the fact that under the instructions given
by the trial judge, the jury could find the defendant's own confession
involuntary and therefore inadmissible, in which instance the confession of the co-defendant could no longer be dismissed as corroborative. But the Court reasoned that the jury must have found the defendant's confession voluntary, for otherwise they would not have returned a verdict of guilty since there was virtually no other evidence
against him. Having concluded the confession was considered by the
jury, the consideration of the confession of the co-defendant was
209

harmless per Harrington.

3.

Prior Testimony of Unavailable Witness

Where the prosecution seeks to introduce the testimony of a
206. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
207. See also United States v. Brown, 452 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1971); Kelley v. Rose, 346
F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
208. 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
209. Cf Justice Marshall. joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. dissenting:
The Court would assume that the jury must have found petitioner's statements to
be voluntary and therefore admissible along with their fruits, because the other
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. This assumption is erroneous for
several reasons. First, the jury may have found that some of petitioner's statements
were involuntary and some were voluntary. The 'voluntary' statements may have
been connected with the co-defendant's statement to support the conviction, while
standing alone, they may have been insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Second,
the jury may have found that the statements were all involuntary but that some
evidence remained free from any taint. Whereas the Court indicates that if the
statements were involuntary, then all the other evidence in the case except the codefendant's statement must be suppressed as a matter of law, the jury was given only
a general instruction on suppression and may, incorrectly and unwittingly, have more
narrowly circumscribed the taint. The co-defendant's statement bolstered any other
evidence considered by the jury. Third, the jury may have found the statements to
be involuntary and ignored all the evidence which the Court says should have been
ignored. The jury may then have convicted on insufficient circumstantial evidence,
including the co-defendant's statement. We need ascribe no malevolence here; we
need only recognize that humans err. Indeed, the very notion of 'harmless error'
should constantly remind us of that. Any one of these things is a reasonable possibility, and despite the apparent certainty with which the Court affirms the decision
below, there remains a deep and haunting doubt as to whether a constitutional
violation contributed to the conviction.
Id. at 436-37.
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witness from a prior proceeding involving the same dispute, it is
necessary to demonstrate a good faith effort to obtain the presence
of the witness. t 0 In Mancusi v. Stubbs,"' the witness had taken up
permanent residency in Sweden subsequent to his testimony at the
first trial. Unlike the availability of uniform procedures for the interstate rendition of witnesses, the Court found no means readily availble to the state to secure the presence of a witness residing in a foreign
country. The witness was therefore unavailable for purposes of excepting the right of confrontation.
The Court then turned to the further consideration of the adequacy of the examination of the witness at the first trial. The defendant contended that since his conviction had been overturned because
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the cross-examination of the witness must have been inadequate. The Court found, however, that the
reversal had been based upon a per se rule of ineffective assistance
presumed from the brevity of time between appointment and trial.
The state court, in affirming the conviction, had expressly found the
cross-examination of the witness adequate, and the Court found no
evidence to the contrary.
In Havey v. Kropp,2 ' the court was sympathetic to the contention that cross-examination at a preliminary hearing was not equivalent to that at trial." ' The petitioner lost, however, becaue by virtue
of a Michigan statute"'4 in effect at the time of the proceedings,
counsel was on notice that under appropriate circumstances the testi210. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
211. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
212. 458 F.2d 1054 (6th Cir. 1972).
213. Whether the formal right of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is
precisely the same as that to cross-examine at trial is open to doubt. In practice
considerations of trial philosophy and tactics generally may militate against more
than a perfunctory cross-examination, if that, and it further appears that crossexaminations at such hearings varies widely in different jurisdictions. It must also
be borne in mind that the issues at a preliminary hearing and at trial are substantially
different, since while at the latter the issue is the guilt or innocence of the accused,
the former is concerned only with whether an offense has been committed and
whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.
Id. at 1056.
214. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.26 (1968) provides in full:
Testimony taken at an examination, preliminary hearing, or at a former trial of the
case, or taken by deposition at the insistence of the defendant, may be used by the
prosecution whenever the witness giving such testimony can not, for any reason, be
produced at the trial, or whenever the witness has, since giving such testimony
become insane or otherwise incapacitated to testify.
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mony might be usable at trial, and he could not "now be heard to
complain because by his own choice he did not fully crossexamine.""1 5 The case is of particular interest because of the implication that in the absence of a statute-the case in Tennessee-the
result might well be different.
H.
i.

Right to Counsel
Nature of Offense

16
Wainwright"

Gideon v.
established the right to counsel in state
trials for felonies. Ever since, the Court had cautiously avoided extending Gideon to less serious offenses."1 7 Finally, in Argersinger v.
Hamlin,"'5 the right was expanded. There, the petitioner was convicted without counsel of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced
to ninety days in jail. The state supreme court had followed the
guideline set in Duncan v. Louisiana,"' authorizing trial by jury when
the potential punishment was more than six months. The Supreme
Court concluded that the right to counsel should attach when any
period of incarceration is involved, regardless of length, but the critical consideration would be actual, not potential punishment.22 Thus,
where a misdemeanor carries alternative sanctions of imprisonment
and fine, the accused may be tried without counsel, so long as the trial
court restricts the punishment to a fine.
2. Stage of the Proceeding
The right to counsel extends to all critical stages of the proceeding against the accused, and this includes sentencing. 2 ' UnitedStates
v. Hone122 has determined that a pre-sentence conference may be
equally critical, and therefore the right to the presence of counsel
215. 485 F.2d at 1057.
216. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
217. As recently as Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 2 (1972), the Court was saying: "A
person charged with a felony in a state court has an unconditional and absolute constitutional
right to a lawyer. Gideon."
218. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
219. 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
220. "We hold, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 407 U.S. at 37.
221. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
222. 456 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1972).
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applies. The appellant entered a plea of guilty to the interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle, but the imposition of sentence was
suspended, and he was placed on probation. Subsequently, he was
charged with violating the conditions of probation, and a hearing was
scheduled for revocation of probation and the imposition of sentence.
On the day prior to the hearing, the trial judge held a conference with
his probation staff, to which the United States attorneys, but not
defense counsel, were invited. The defendant was also not present. At
the hearing, counsel for defendant objected to the presence of the
prosecution but not the defense at the conference, but the objection
was overruled,223 and sentence imposed. The appellate court viewed
the contention of the defendant as a matter of some substance. Citing
Townsend v. Burke, 224 in which the Supreme Court recognized the
right to counsel at the hearing on sentencing, the court concluded:
[W]e believe that the District Court's practice of inviting the United
States Attorneys, but not defense counsel, to the pre-sentence conference affords an unnecessary risk that the prosecutors might supply incorrect and unchallenged information which could influence
225
the sentence.
Finding no prejudice to the defendant in the present case, the court
affirmed the conviction, but with the admonition that henceforth "the
practices of the District Court regarding pre-sentence conference be
modified in accordance with this opinion. ' 22 1 While the language of
the court suggests an exercise of its supervisory power over the federal district courts, its reasoning and much of its authority may be
interpreted as espousing values protected by the sixth amendment
right to counsel, in which event the holding may be of significance in
state courts as well.
223. "Inoverruling Appellant's objection to the District Court's practice respecting the
pre-sentence conferrence, the District Judge stated his belief that once a defendant has been
found guilty he has reached the point where his rights are exhausted and the rights of the state
are now the ones that the Court is concerned with. After a determination that a defendant has
committed a wrong against the state, it is necessary, in the District Judge's view, that the state
be given a voice in deciding what the penalty for what wrong shall be. Noting that the defendant
is given an opportunity to speak in open court before the sentence is imposed, the District Judge
reasoned that the prosecutor is entitled to represent the state's interest in determining the
sentence at the pre-sentence conference." Id. at 496.
224. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
225. 456 F.2d at 496-97.
226. Id. at 497.
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Effective Assistance

Cases continued to reflect the principle that, where counsel is
retained by the accused, the effectiveness of assistance cannot be
raised, because the performance of counsel is not state action. 27 The
standard for ineffectiveness remains showing that the trial was reduced to a farce, sham or mockery of justice,22 a standard that was
22 where counsel failed to investigate an
satisfied in Johns v. Perini,
alibi claimed by the defendant.
4.

Fruits of Denial

When an accused has been improperly denied the assistance of
counsel, not only should a conviction thereby secured not stand, but
the accused should suffer no collateral consequences from the deprivation of his constitutional right. Thus the Supreme Court has held
that a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may not be used to
adjudge the defendant an habitual criminal23 and may not be used
at the sentencing stage to enhance punishment."' In Loper v.
Beto, 232 the Court held it equally impermissible to use such convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testified in his own
behalf.
I.

Identifications

The right to counsel at a lineup identification 23 was held in
Kirby v. Illinois"4 to apply only after initiation of a criminal pro227. Loukas v. Johnson, 543 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1972); Weaver v. State, 472 S.W.2d 898
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971): Webb v. State, 475 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Sykes v.
State, 477 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brotherton v, State, 477 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1971): Bratton v. State, 477 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). See also 1968
Survey at 251: 1969 Survey at 482; 1970 Survey at 225; 1971 Survey at 273.
An anomalous passage may be found in Cureton v. State, 477 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tenn.
Crim, App. 1971): "The record does not disclose whether or not this counsel was privately
retained. For the purpose of this appeal it does not make any difference. Had his counsel been
court appointed, he would have been entitled to no better representation than he might have
been able to obtain otherwise."
228. Webb v. State, 475 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). See also 1969 Survey at
482: 1970 Survey at 225; 1971 Survey at 273.
229. 462 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1972).
230. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
231. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
232. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
233. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
234. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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ceeding "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, arraignment.1 3 5 Identifications occurring
prior to this time remain susceptible to analysis under the due process
clause and may be suppressed if "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. ' 23 6 The right to counsel
is inapplicable when the witness confronts the accused in a chance
encounter.2 37 The absence of counsel at an identification may also be
dismissed as harmless.2 16 Just as a suspect may be compelled to
participate in lineup, 239 he may also be compelled, by court order if
necessary, to execute handwriting exemplars for identification pur24
poses.
J.

Self-Incrimination

1. Electing to Testify
An accused in a criminal case has the privilege not to take the
stand, and the election of the privilege may not be the subject of
adverse comment by the prosecution or the court. 24 , If, however, he
waives the privilege and testifies in his own behalf, he is subject to
cross-examination to the same extent as any other witness.2 4 2 Nor is
the privilege unconstitutionally compromised where the defendant is
properly charged with more than one offense in a single trial, and he
wishes to testify only as to a portion of the charges. 243 A defendant
who asserts his privilege cannot be compelled to participate in an
experiment in the presence of the jury, 241 but it is no violation of the
25
privilege to require him to appear in court.
235. Id. at 689.
236. Id. at 691.
237. Kelley v. State, 478 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
238. Daugherty v. State, 478 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Rice v. State, 475
S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
239. See. e.g., United States v. Haley, 431 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1970); People ex rel.
Blassick v. Gallahan, 50 III. 2d 267, 279 N.E.2d 1 (1972); People v. Gilleylan, 31 Mich. App.
416, 188 N.W.2d 131 (1971); State v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1972); People v. Falco, 67
Misc. 2d 520, 324 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1971); Taylor v. State, 474 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971).
240. United States v. Ruggirello, 454 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1972).
241. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
242. Hicks v. State. 480 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
243. Kirk v. United States, 457 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1972).
244. Stokes v. State, 64 Tenn. 619 (1875).
245. Black v. State, 479 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
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Silence in the Face of Accusation

In a significant footnote, Miranda v. Arizona 4 ' held:
[IIt is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that47
he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.1
In Kelley v. State,24 the defendants, one of whom was an offduty policeman, were convicted of burglary. The explanation given
by the defense was that the two were driving past the burgled premises and noticed a broken window. One of them got out to investigate,
found some lamps and other items on the ground, and put them in
the car. They intended to report the matter to the police. Thereafter,
they came upon a security guard at another place of business with
whom they conversed for an extended time, in the course of which
the police arrived and arrested them, having been given their license
number by an eyewitness. At the trial, the prosecution showed on
cross-examination that both defendants had refused to make statements after being informed of their Miranda rights. The court held
that under the unique facts of this case footnote 37 was inapplicable:
[I]n this most unusual case subjudice, a police officer says that he
was bent upon reporting the facts of this burglary as soon as he
could get in touch with certain other officers; and in such a case,
when the truth apparently is that he did not report what he now
claims happened as soon as he had the opportunity, he can be crossexamined about this. obvious inconsistence between his testimony
and the facts.249
Rather, the controlling precedent was Harris v. New York,25 0 in
which the Supreme Court held that a confession obtained in violation
of Miranda could be used for purposes of impeachment where the
direct testimony of the defendant was patently inconsistent therewith.2"' For the same reason, the court found nothing improper in the
246.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

247. Id. at 468 n.37.
248. 478 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
249. Id. at 75.
250. 401 U,S. 222 (1971).
251. "The fact that these men chose not to give statements was not shown by the state
in its proof in chief, and only developed after they gave their version that they were trying to
report the occurrence." 478 S.W.2d at 75.
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prosecution showing that the defendant refused permission to search
his car at the scene of the arrest and that the prosecution referred to
both of these matters in its argument to the jury.
3.

Granting Immunity

In Kastigar v. United States,"' the Supreme Court was called
upon to determine the scope of immunity required by the privilege
against self-incrimination in order that a witness could be compelled
to testify before the grand jury. Petitioner had been granted immunity
pursuant to a federal statute 53 that precluded the use or derivative
use of any of his testimony. The Court first summarily rejected the
argument that the privilege against self-incrimination forbade compelled testimony, irrespective of the granting of immunity. 5 4 It then
turned to the more troublesome argument: was the "use" immunity
conferred by the statute a sufficient safeguard of the privilege against
self-incrimination, or did that protection require, as urged by the
petitioner, "transactional" immunity-immunity from prosecution
for any offenses divulged by the testimony of the witness. The Court
concluded that the former was adequate:
While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate
with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader. Transactional immunity, which affords full immunity from prosecution for
the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the
witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against being "forced to give testimony
leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.' "
Immunity from the use of compelled testimony as well as evidence
derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. 5
The contention that it may often be impossible to prove the derivative
use of testimony was met with the response found in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission:'
252.
253.

406 U.S. 441 (1972).
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1969).

254. The Court reaffirmed its holdings in this regard in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896) and Uliman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).

255.
256.

406 U.S. at 453.
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state
grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the
federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence
is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legiti25
mate source for the disputed evidence.
As a result, the derivative use of compelled testimony was viewed
258
consistently with the derivative use of coerced confessions.
K.

Trial by Jury

In two significant decisions, the Supreme Court confronted a
previously reserved issue 25 9-the propriety of less than unanimous
26 °
verdicts in criminal cases. In Johnson v. Louisiana,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that permitted a verdict
of guilty or not guilty by a vote of nine of twelve jurors. Because the
case was tried prior to the application of the sixth amendment right
to trial by jury to the states,'26 which was not retroactive,2 2 the Court
addressed itself to due process and equal protection consideration.
Apodaca v. Oregon2 3 involved three convictions, two obtained by
Il-I verdicts, and one by a 10-2 verdict. There, the Court was concerned with the minimum requirement of the right to trial by jury.
In Johnson, the appellant first contended that when less than all
jurors vote for conviction guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the due process clause. 24 The Court responded that the conclusion of guilt by nine jurors applying the reasonable doubt standard was sufficient to satisfy due process. Nor was
the Court impressed by the argument that the less-than-unanimousverdict procedure effectively diminished the persuasive thrust of a
minority of three or less. 25 The equal protection contention was di257. Id. at 79 n.18.
258. In dissenting opinions, Justices Douglas and Marshall contended that use immunity
was an inadequate protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
259. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
260. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
261. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
262. See DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
263. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
264. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
265. Appellant, in effect, asks us to assume that, when minority jurors express
sincere doubts about guilt, their fellow jurors will nevertheless ignore them and vote
to convict even if deliberation has not been exhausted and minority jurors have
grounds for acquittal which, if pursued, might persuade members of the majority to
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rected to the fact that the state procedure required unanimous verdicts in capital cases and in cases using five man juries. Again, the
Court found the argument without merit:
Appellant might well have been ultimately acquitted had he committed a capital offense. But as we have indicated, this does not
constitute a denial of equal protection of the law; the State may
treat capital offenders differently without violating the constitutional rights of those charged with lesser crimes. As to the crimes
triable by a five-man jury, if appellant's position is that it is easier
to convince nine of 12 jurors than to convince all of five, he is simply
challenging the judgment of the Louisiana Legislature. That body
obviously intended to vary the difficulty of proving guilt with the
gravity of the offense and the severity of the punishment. We remain
unconvinced by anything appellant has presented that this legislative judgment was defective in any constitutional sense. 2"
In Apodaca, the Court turned to Williams v. Florida67 to identify the "essential feature" of trial by jury to be "the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment
of a group of laymen. '"268 "A requirement of unanimity," submitted
acquit. But the mere fact that three jurors voted to acquit does not in itself demonstrate that, had the nine jurors of the majority attended further to reason and the
evidence, all or one of them would have developed a reasonable doubt about guilt.
We have no grounds for believeing that majority jurors, aware of their responsibility
and power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments presented to them in favor of acquittal, terminate discussion and render a
verdict. On the contrary it is far more likely that a juror presenting reasoned argument in favor of acquittal would either have his arguments answered or would carry
enough other jurors with him to prevent conviction. A majority will cause discussion
and outvote a minority only after reasoned discussion has ceased to have persuasive
reasons in support of its position. At that juncture there is no basis for denigrating
the vote of so large a majority of the jury or for refusing to accept their decision as
being, at least in their minds, beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, at this point, a
"dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one ... [when
it made] no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself." Appellant offers no evidence that majority jurors simply
ignore the reasonable doubts of their colleagues or otherwise act irresponsibly in
casting their votes in favor of conviction and before we alter our own longstanding
perceptions about jury behavior and overturn a considered legislative judgment that
unanimity is not essential to reasoned jury verdicts, we must have some basis for
doing so other than unsupported assumptions.
406 U.S. at 361-62.
266. Id. at 364-65.
267. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
268. Id. at 100.
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the Court, "does not materially contribute to the exercise of this
commonsense judgment." '69 As to the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the Court simply responded that nothing in the
sixth amendment right to trial by jury required such a quantum of
proof. Whatever merit the argument had in a due process context had
been addressed in Johnson. Finally, the petitioner pointed to the fact
that the jury should reflect a cross section of the community, an ideal
that was compromised by a system permitting verdicts without the
acquiescence of minority groups represented on the jury. The Court
first discounted this argument as a misconception of the jury system.
All that the Constitution forbade was the systematic exclusion of
definitive groups from jury panels. This was not equivalent to a requirement of proportionate representation on the panel or on the jury
selected, and even if it be assumed that the non-unanimous jury system had the effect contended, "[n]o group . . . has the right to block
convictions." 7 ' Furthermore, accepting the hypothesis of "group voting," the fact that a minority group might be outvoted ultimately did
not mean that the viewpoint was not adequately represented in the
jury deliberations. Thus, the Court concluded non-unanimous juries
were not violative of the right to trial by jury. 7'
L.

Fair Trial

Among the more surprising decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court was Brooks v. Tennessee, 72 declaring unconstitutional a Tennessee statute27 3 that required that a defendant in a criminal case
"desiring to testify shall do so before any other testimony for the
defense is heard by the court trying the case." The Court found the
statute irreconcilable with the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to due process. In the first regard, the Court quoted an 1889
decision by the Supreme Court of Mississippi 7 ' to the effect that a
defendant should not be compelled to make an election whether to
testify in his own behalf until an evaluation of all the evidence of both
the prosecution and the defense can be made. 2 5 Because the defen269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

406 U.S. at 410.
Id. at 413.
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented.
406 U.S. 605 (1972).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955).
Bell v. State, 66 Miss. 192, 5 So. 389 (1889).
See also Nassif v. District of Columbia, 201 A.2d 519 (D.C. App. 1964).
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dant can not be certain of the strength of his case before his witnesses
are called,"'6 the Court concluded the statute "casts a heavy burden
on a defendant's otherwise unconditional right not to take the
stand."277

For the due process argument, the Court turned to Ferguson v.
Georgia,7 ' which involved a state statute providing that a defendant
in a criminal case could not testify under oath but could make an
unsworn statement at trial. There, the Court held it improper to deny
the defendant the assistance of counsel in eliciting his statement
through questions. 7 9 The restriction deprived the accused of "the
guiding hand of counsel.""28 In the present case, the Court, concluding the same could be said of the Tennessee statute, submitted:
Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical
decision as well as a matter of constitutional right. By requiring the
accused and his lawyer to make that choice without an opportunity
to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence, the statute restricts
the defense-particularly counsel-in the planning of its case. Furthermore, the penalty for not testifying first is to keep the defendant
off the stand entirely, even though as a matter of professional judgment his lawyer might want to call him later in the trial. The accused is thereby deprived of the "guiding hand of counsel" in the
21
timing of this critical element of his defense. 1
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissented in an opinion of some persuasion, arguing that the
self-incrimination holding of the majority was without precedent and
the due process argument equally vulnerable as amounting "to nothing more than the assertion that counsel may not be restricted by
ordinary rules of evidence and procedure in presenting an accused's
276. "[H]e cannot be absolutely certain that his witnesses will testify as expected or that
they will be effective on the stand. They may collapse under skillful and persistent crossexamination, and through no fault of their own they may fail to impress the jury as honest and
reliable witnesses. In addition, a defendant is sometimes compelled to call a hostile prosecution
witness as his own. Unless the State provides for discovery depositions of prosecution witnesses,
which Tennessee apparently does not, the defendant is unlikely to know whether this testimony
will prove entirely favorable." 406 U.S. at 609-10.
277. Id. at 610-11.
278. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
279. The holding was based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, not
the sixth amendment right to counsel.
280. 365 U.S. at 572 (quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
281. 406 U.S. at 612-13.
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defense if it might be more advantageous to present it in some other
way." 282
2 3
In another Supreme Court decision, Giglio v. United States,
a principal witness for the prosecution responded in crossexamination that he had not been excused from prosecution in return
for testifying. Following conviction, counsel for defendant discovered
that such a promise had in fact been made. In response to the motion
for a new trial, the government conceded the making of the promise.
There was an apparent misunderstanding between two Assistant
United States Attorneys as to the existence of the promise, but the
position of the government was that the promise had not been authorized, and its disclosure to the jury would not have affected the verdict.
The motion for a new trial was denied. The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the testimony of the challenged witness was critical to
the case, and the due process rights of the defendant were equally
offended, "whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or
design."2"4

Finally, in Nunley v. State,285 a dispute arose within the Court
of Criminal Appeals concerning an alleged inconsistency between the
offense charged and the jury verdict. The defendant was charged with
concealing stolen property. The jury foreman reported the verdict as
follows:
We find both defendants guilty, I guess it would be petty larceny
less than One Hundred Dollars and recommend the sentence to be
8
one year and a day. 1

Judgment was entered on a finding of guilty of concealing stolen
property. While the majority viewed any discrepancy as "hypertechnical and not in the spirit of the law, '

287

Judge Oliver, dissenting,

contended that "the defendant was not convicted of concealing stolen
property, the offense charged in the indictment."2 8 At the extreme,
282. ld. at 615-16. Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he
inaccurately assumed that the majority opinion was based on the sixth amendment right to
counsel.
283. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
284. Id. at 154.
285. 479 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
286. Id. at 839.
287. Id.
288. Id. "Plainly, a verdict finding an accused guilty of a crime for which he was not
indicted is void. 'If it's void, it's void,' as a law school professor was wont to say." Id. at 840.
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such a variance may raise a constitutional question of the deprivation
of due process," 9 or a failure to adequately apprise the accused of the
nature and cause of accusation required by the fifth amendment.290
Short of this, however, at common law it is improper to charge an
accused with one crime and convict him of another. 9' The issue most
frequently arises where there is a discrepancy between the indictment
and the charge to the jury.292 The majority viewed the inconsistency
here as more apparent than real, merely reflecting the inarticulateness of the jury foreman, and bolstered its conclusion by noting the
failure of the defendant to object at the time the verdict was taken.
If such a verdict is void on its face, however, such considerations are
immaterial since "the court had no power to pronounce a judgment
upon it." '93
M.

Punishment

In Furman v. Georgia,94 the Supreme Court declared capital
punishment, at least as applied in the cases before the Court, to be
unconstitutional. Only two members of the Court held the death
penalty unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment proscribed
by the eighth amendment. Other members of the majority supported
their conclusion by due process and equal protection considerations,
such as the arbitrariness with which the penalty was imposed and the
disproportionate use against members of minority groups. In Wooten
v. State, 9 5 the court held that the imposition of consecutive as opposed to cumulative sentences was within the discretion of the trial
judge, and in Frazier v. State,296 the court held that the habitual
criminal statute297 did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
While Judge Oliver does not see fit to identify the phantom professor, it is submitted that
graduates of this law school will consider such identification unnecessary.
289. Cf Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
290. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS §§ 88-91.
291. See 5 WHARTON § 3060.
292. Judkins v. State, 224 Tenn. 587, 458 S.W.2d 801 (1970); Huffman v. State, 200
Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738 (1956).
293. Mayfield v. State, 101 Tenn. 673, 49 S.W. 742 (1899) (quoted by the dissent).
294. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
295. 477 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
296. 480 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
297. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2806 (1955).
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Double Jeopardy

1. Multiple Offenses
The notion of collateral estoppel as an aspect of double jeopardy
was first recognized in Ashe v. Swenson,"'8 in which the Court precluded successive prosecutions of robbery, each as to a different victim, when the petitioner had been found not guilty in the first instance. The Court found that "[t]he single rationally conceivable
issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been
one of the robbers." '99 That issue, having been favorably determined
for the accused once, was not subject to relitigation.
In Turner v. Arkansas,3 0 the application of Ashe arose in a
different context. At his first trial, the petitioner was charged with
felony-murder, the death resulting from the perpetration of a robbery. He was only charged with the homicide, not the robbery, but
the state stipulated that the robbery and murder arose out of "the
same set of facts, circumstances, and the same occasion." ' "' Under
the instruction given the jury, if they found the petitioner to be a
participant in the robbery, then they were to find the petitioner guilty
of first-degree murder, whether the death was premeditated or unintentional. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of murder, and
thereafter the state brought a separate charge of robbery. The Court
found the case "squarely controlled" by Ashe, and therefore the
robbery charge was barred by the protection against double
jeopardy. 02
Neither the Ashe nor the Turner decisions preclude multiple
prosecutions resulting from the same criminal transaction. 3 Tennessee courts, however, have disallowed such multiple prosecutions
barring a showing of "separate and distinct offenses with separate
intents."'30 ' Such a showing was made in Rockett v. State,315 where

the defendant was convicted of both robbery and rape. However, in
298. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
299. Id. at 445.
300. 407 U.S. 366 (1972).
301. Id. at 367.
302. "The only logical conclusion is that the jury found him not present at the scene of
the murder and robbery, a finding which negates the possibility of a constitutionally valid
conviction for the robbery of Yates." Id. at 369.
303. See also United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1972).
304. Rockett v. State, 475 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
305. 475 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
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Acres v. State,0° a case comparable to Turner, convictions of both
first-degree murder and robbery were held improper, because "[t]he
two offenses were parts of a single continuing act. ' 30 7 And in
Brumley v. State,3 8 the court followed a lengthening line of decisions309 holding that one cannot be convicted of both burglary and
larceny arising out of the same set of facts.
2.

Multiple Defendants

Ashe does not intimate the proper result in the instance of inconsistent fact findings in a single verdict. Jackson v. State3 11 suggests
that such capriciousness is the price of the jury system. There, the
defendant complained that the jury had found his co-defendant not
guilty and him guilty in a joint trial in which the same evidence was
used against both. The court held the verdict permissible by statute 31 ,
and saw nothing offensive in the result, so long as the offense charged
could be perpetrated by one person. "Even where the evidence is the
same as to all defendants, an acquittal of one does not mandate
acquittal of the others. 31 2 No mention was made of Ashe and its
progeny.
3.

Harsher Sentence on Re-Trial

Resolving a dispute of some magnitude between state and federal courts in recent years, 3 3 in Pendergrass v. Neil314 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the rule of
North Carolina v. Pearce31 1 precluding the imposition of a more
severe sentence on re-trial than was imposed at a previous trial, absent the occurrence of material events between the trials, was applicable to jury-imposed punishment as well as judge-imposed punish306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

312.
313.
314.
315.

484 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. 1972).
Id. at 537.
475 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
See 1971 Survey at 288; 1970 Survey at 242.
477 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2523 (1955).
477 S.W.2d at 215.
See 1971 Survey at 208; 1971 Survey at 245-46.
456 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1972).
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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ment.31 6 This interpretation
of Pearce was given retroactive applica31 7
tion in Riviera v. Rose.
316. The reasons were persuasively expressed by Chief Judge Gray, in the decision of
the lower court in the same case:
It is made clear, both by the explicit language of Pearce and by the obvious policy
considerations which constitute its ratio decidendi, that the Pearce decision is concerned with the assuagement of the fear of possible vindictiveness-regardless of
whether such fear is in fact warranted by actual resentencing practices in given
jurisdiction. It is obvious that the possibility of incurring a longer sentence on retrial,
either as a result of vindictive resentencing practices or merely as the result of
happenstance, exerts a chilling effect upon a defendant's inclination to embark upon
whatever appellate routes may ostensibly be 'open' to him. The existence of such a
possibility places an unjustly-convicted defendant in the anomalous and unfair predicament of having to run the risk of a harsher sentence merely to obtain that to
which he was constitutionally entitled in the beginning-viz., a fair and error-free
trial. It is thus manfest that the broad principles of due process which underlie the
Pearce decision apply as forcefully to resentencing by a jury as they do to resentencing by a judge.
Pendergrass v. Neil, 338 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (M.D. Tenn. 1971). Cf. Chaffin v. Stychcombe,
455 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1972).
317. 465 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1972).

